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TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOL
TUITION: MUELLER v. ALLEN
Private schools bear a significant share of the burden of education
in the United States.' Legislators regularly introduce bills to provide
state and federal assistance to private education.2 Courts have strug-
gled to determine which types of public aid to private education pass
constitutional muster.3  In Mueller v. Allen,4 the United States
1. Five million children (11% of all school children) attended private elementary
and secondary schools in the 1981-82 school year. A Boostfor Private Schools, TIME,
Apr. 26, 1982, at 21.
2. Many states have enacted private education assistance programs of various
types. See infra note 3.
At the federal level, Congress has regularly introduced legislation proposing tuition
expense relief programs since the 1950's. Tuition Tax Credits, 1981: Hearings on
S550 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1981). The Educational Opportunity and Equity
Act of 1983, introduced before the Senate in February, 1983, proposed tax credits for
50% of expenses paid to private elementary and secondary schools. The maximum
credit would have been $ 100 per dependent in 1983, increasing to $300 per dependent
in 1985 and thereafter. S.528, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1335-38 (daily
ed. Feb. 17, 1983). In support of the measure, President Reagan urged Congress to
enact the legislation as "a way to lighten the 'double burden"' upon parents support-
ing both public and private schools. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY ACT OF 1983, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (February 17, 1983).
3. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (grants for state-prepared tests and services); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (textbooks, services and instructional materials); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (textbooks, instructional materials and counseling services); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition reimbursements); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition tax credits); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (grants to subsidize
testing and record keeping); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds for
constructing buildings and facilities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(grants for constructing buildings and facilities); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (reimbursements for salaries, textbooks and materials); Earley v. DiCenso, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supplements); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax
exemption for religious institutions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(textbook loans); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time program); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus transportation).
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Supreme Court held that a Minnesota statute5 authorizing a limited
tax deduction6 for public and private education expenses' does not
4. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
5. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09, subd. 22 (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in
grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in
attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and
secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught
in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doc-
trines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to,
extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
Id
6. The tax deduction may not exceed $500 per dependent in grades kindergarten
to six and $700 per dependent in grades seven to twelve. Id
7. The district court in Mueller found deductible tuition expenses to include:
1. Tuition in the ordinary sense.
2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside their res-
idence school districts.
3. Certain summer school tuition.
4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services.
5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to
students who are physically unable to attend classes at such school.
6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elementary or
secondary school if the instruction is acceptable for credit in an elementary
or secondary school.
7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12.
8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum.
Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn. 1981).
The district court further determined that deductible transportation expenses
included:
[T]he cost of transporting students in school districts that do not provide free
transportation, the cost of transporting students who live in one district but at-
tend school in another, and the cost of transporting students who attend school in
their residence district but who do not qualify for free transportation because of
proximity to their schools of attendance.
Id
The district court found that textbook deductions include not only secular text-
books subject to these restrictions, but also certain requisite equipment, including:
1. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes.
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violate the establishment clause' of the United States Constitution.9
Petitioners l° sought on behalf of the taxpayers of Minnesota to in-
validate a Minnesota tax statute granting taxpayers a limited tax de-
duction for their dependents' tuition, textbook, and transportation
expenditures."I Parents whose children attended either public or pri-
vate elementary and secondary schools qualified for the deduction.' 2
Petitioners argued that the statute violated the establishment clause
of the first amendment.'" The district court granted respondents'1 4
3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics.
5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum requirements.
6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements of
shop classes.
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
Id
8. The establishment and free exercise clauses provide that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The religion clauses of the first amendment
apply to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 814 n.5 (1978) (a discussion of the problems encoun-
tered in incorporating the establishment clause into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment).
9. Although petitioners had formally asserted in the lower courts that the Minne-
sota statute violated both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, Brief for Appellants at 1, Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982),
petitioners' arguments before the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court focused ex-
clusively on whether the statute impermissibly advanced religion.
Most cases involving public aid to private education evoke predominantly estab-
lishment clause concerns. Occasionally, free exercise claims arise. Eg., Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (a program lending public school text-
books to private school students did not inhibit the free exercise of religion because
the program lacked coercive effect).




13. See supra notes 8-9.
14. Petitioners named Clyde E. Allen, Jr., Commissioner of the Minnesota De-
partment of Revenue, as defendant. The other defendants intervened individually
and on behalf of the taxpayers of Minnesota. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 998
(D. Minn. 1981).
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cross motion for summary judgment, 5 finding the statute neutral
both on its face and in its application. 16 Affirming the district court
decision, 7 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the statute primarily effected neither the advancement nor the
inhibition of religion.' 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' 9 and
in a five-to-four decision affirmed the court of appeals.20
The drafters of the Constitution designed the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment to prevent conflict be-
tween civil and religious authorities.2 ' In determining the scope and
effect of the religion clauses, the Supreme Court initially embraced
the concept of separation between church and state as embodied in
Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation. 22 The Court gradually
15. Respondents cross-motioned for summary judgment upon petitioners' motion
for summary judgment. Id at 1003.
16. Petitioners contended that the statute, although facially neutral, assisted par-
ents of public school children. Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct.
3062 (1983). At trial, petitioners submitted affidavits and other evidence showing that
during 1979-80, only 4.56% of the 90,954 private school pupils attended nonsectarian
schools. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. at 1001. Petitioners claimed that the benefits
afforded under the statute accrued primarily to parents of children attending sectarian
schools. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). Respon-
dents attacked the admissibility of the affidavits at trial, Mueller v. Allen, 514 F.
Supp. at 999, and disputed the accuracy of petitioners' statistics, claiming that the
petitioners ignored part-time and other tuition payments made by public school par-
ents. Id at 1002. The district court did not rule on the validity of respondents'
claims. Id
17. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982).
18. See supra notes 8-9.
19. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because a conflict existed between the
circuits on the precise question presented in the case. In Rhode Island Fed'n of
Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit held
that a Rhode Island statute identical in all pertinent parts to the Minnesota statute in
Mueller violated the establishment clause.
20. See infra note 61.
21. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). The religion clauses of the
first amendment lack a single, clear legislative intent. At least three viewpoints ex-
isted prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights: 1) the Jeffersonian view that a wall
of separation should safeguard the state against ecclesiastical interference; 2) the view
of Roger Williams that separation would serve largely to protect churches against the
state; and 3) the view of James Madison that both religion and government function
best when separate from the restrictive sphere of the other. See L. TRIBE, supra note
8, at § 14-3.
' 22. Thomas Jefferson wrote the phrase "wall of separation between Church and
State" in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802. Comment, Jefferson and
the Church-State Wall A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978
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modified the goal of separation between church and state, striving
instead for state neutrality toward religion.23 While the Court has
frequently considered the constitutionality of state aid programs to
private education,24 it has failed to delineate the degree to which state
aid programs may benefit sectarian schools.2"
Development of modem establishment clause analysis26 concern-
ing public aid to private education began with Everson v. Board of
Education.27 In Everson, the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey
statute authorizing reimbursements for bus fares paid by parents of
both public and parochial school children for transportation to and
B.Y.U. L. REV. 645 n.1 (citing S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (2d ed.
1969) and THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 346 (P. Ford ed. 1905)).
23. Total separation between church and state is a practical impossibility. "We
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Advocates of church-state separation advanced a
"no aid" approach in which the state could do nothing to aid religion. This approach,
however, creates a constitutional dilemma. By providing fire and police protection to
churches and religious institutions, the state aids religion; yet, due process and equal
protection require the state to provide such services. Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal Development Part I. The Non-Establishment Prin-
ciple, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 520-21 (1968).
The establishment clause must be interpreted in light of the free exercise clause,
and vice versa. Either clause, carried to its extreme, would negate the other clause. In
the area of released time programs, for example, the establishment clause concern
that the state not advance religion must be weighed against the right of citizens to
freely participate in religious activities. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (the free exercise clause compelled upholding a released time program held off
campus despite establishment clause objections) with McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (the free exercise clause did not overcome the establishment
clause disposition against released time programs held on campus). To accommodate
both clauses, the Supreme Court adopted "neutrality" as a more appropriate descrip-
tion of the proper state attitude toward religion. Chief Justice Burger explained:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has
been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints pro-
ductive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (emphasis added).
24. See supra note 3.
25. See infra note 52.
26. See generally Weber, Building on Sand- Supreme Court Construction and Edu-
cational Tax Credits, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 531 (1978-79) (a concise overview of the
background and development of establishment clause interpretation in cases of public
assistance for private schools).
27. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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from school.28 Although the Court unanimously agreed that the first
amendment required strict separation between church and state, a
majority held that the transportation program did not foster an estab-
lishment of religion.29 Recognizing that the program approved in Ev-
erson benefited sectarian schools, the Court established the principle
that benefits derived from public welfare legislation which flow indi-
rectly to religious organizations do not violate the establishment
clause.3 °
The Court next addressed the issue of public aid to private educa-
tion twenty-one years later in Board of Education v. Allen .31 In up-
holding a state law requiring public schools to lend textbooks to both
public and private school students,32 the Allen Court articulated a
two-part test: an enactment must have a secular legislativepurpose3 3
and aprimary effect34 that neither advances nor inhibits religion.35
28. Id at 17.
29. Id at 18. Everson illustrates the shift in the Court's position from "no aid"
separation to neutrality. The majority opinion stated that the first amendment pre-
cludes the government from passing "laws which aid one. . . [or] all religions," id at
15, and that the amendment "has erected a wall between church and state." Id at 18.
Elsewhere, however, the majority stated that the first amendment "requires the state
to be a neutral" toward religious groups. Id The result reached in the case confirms
that the majority relied on the neutrality rationale. In dissent, a bewildered Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson marveled that the majority opinion reminded him "of Julia who, accord-
ing to Byron's reports, whispering 'I will ne'er consent'--consented." Id at 19.
30. Justice Black, writing on behalf of the majority, stated: "It is undoubtedly
true that children are helped to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that
some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were com-
pelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... " Id at 17.
31. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
32. The statute required public school officials to lend only secular textbooks. 1d
at 245.
33. InAllen, the New York Legislature provided that the purpose of the statute
was to further "the educational opportunities available to the young." Id at 243.
Courts rarely question the sufficiency of the secular purpose of statutes aiding pri-
vate education. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Sloan v. Lemon, 413
U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.
1980); Buchanan, GovernmentaliAid to Sectarian Schools.: A Study in Corrosive Prece-
dents, 15 Hous. L. REv. 783 (1978). But cf Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(no secular purpose found in a statute prohibiting teaching of evolution in public
schools).
34. 392 U.S. at 243.
35. Courts have particular difficulty assessing the primary effect of legislation as-
sisting sectarian schools. The judiciary has long recognized that parochial schools
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/5
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As in Everson, the Court concluded that the state aid program had
the primary effect of assisting parents and children rather than sectar-
ian schools.36 Moreover, Allen affirmed the Everson rationale that
statutes benefiting all students without regard to religious affiliation
tend to satisfy the neutrality requirement of the first amendment.37
Supreme Court decisions following Allen added a third element to
the secularpurpose-primary effect test: a statute or program must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.38 Exces-
sive administrative entanglement may occur when government must
serve both secular and religious purposes. See, e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (parochial schools benefit the state as well as instruct in
religion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parochial schools suffi-
ciently serve the state's interest in education). Whether public aid directed toward the
secular function of sectarian schools impermissibly advances the religious function
constitutes a major issue in establishment clause analysis.
36. The Court recognized that sectarian schools benefited to the extent that the
schools did not have to purchase textbooks for their students. This benefit, however,
did not impermissibly advance religion. 392 U.S. at 244. A commentator has pointed
out the futility of trying to differentiate between benefit to students and benefit to
schools by comparing it to the outdated attempt to classify local pilotage laws as
either safety regulations or commerce regulations. "It was the beginning of wisdom
when the Court candidly recognized that such measures were regulations of
both. .. " Freund, Public Aid to Private Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1682-83
(1969),
37. The statute in both Everson and Allen extended assistance to all students with-
out regard to the religious orientation of the schools attended. 392 U.S. at 242-43.
Such statutes carry a greater presumption of neutrality than those benefiting only
private school students.
Other factors influencing a statute's neutrality toward religion include historical
acceptance of the benefit's propriety, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970);
the nature of the religious organizations benefited, see infra note 57; the nature of the
assistance provided, see infra note 59; and whether the aid necessitates excessive en-
tanglement between church and state, see infira notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
38. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970). In Walz, the Court upheld state tax exemption of religious institutions.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that such exemption is "deeply
embedded in the fabric of our national life," 397 U.S. at 676, and that "[t]here is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id at 675.
Eliminating the tax exemption would create increased government involvement in
"tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures and the direct confronta-
tions and conflicts that follow in the train of these legal processes." Id at 674. The
Court distinguished tax exemption from a direct money subsidy to religious organiza-
tions, which would be "pregnant with involvement .. " Id at 675. Contra Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), discussed
infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (upheld direct money subsidies to private
secular and nonsecular elementary schools).
Private education advocates also wish to avoid excessive entanglement and the re-
1984]
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maintain surveillance of religious institutions and employees or re-
solve religious disputes.39 Excessive political entanglement can result
from state aid programs that tend to polarize public opinion along
religious lines.' Although church-state entanglement inevitably ex-
ists to some degree,41 courts must determine whether excessive entan-
glement exists on a case-by-case basis.41
strictions on freedom which may follow. Note, Aid to Private Education.- Persistent
Lawmakers and the Court, 16 GONz. L. REV. 171, 174 n.24 (1980).
39. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971), the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law providing private schools direct reimbursement for salaries, text-
books and instructional materials. The statute restricted the cash grants to secular
uses and prescribed procedures to audit and inspect schools' financial records. The
Court ruled that the contacts necessary to ensure secular use of the grants involved
excessive and enduring entanglement between church and state. Id at 619. The
Court distinguished Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) as cases aiding students rather than schools, But see
supra note 36. The Court further stated that dedicated religious teachers would "in-
evitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral." 403 U.S. at 618.
The Court later found this propensity to inculcate religion inherent in cases involving
other forms of aid. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (possibility that
instructional materials and equipment would be used to teach religious values); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (possibility that testing and counseling on sectarian
school premises would convey religious values).
40. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court extended its political
entanglement analysis in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra note
38. After assuming that citizens in communities served by parochial schools would
campaign and vote on measures supporting private schools in a manner consistent
with their religious beliefs, the Court concluded that "[t]he potential divisiveness of
such conflict is a threat to the normal political process." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622
(quoting Waz, 397 U.S. at 695) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). "It conflicts with our
whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume
such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert atten-
tion from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623. In the Court's opinion, aid requiring annual appropriations
seemed particularly divisive. The Court's reasoning, however, is dubious. The first
amendment does not preclude persons and organizations from attempting to bring
about legislation consistent with their religious convictions. By recognizing that ordi-
nary political debate is "normal and healthy," Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622, the Court
implied that religious debate is undesirable. Weber, supra note 26, at 551.
Considering the current legislative interest in providing assistance for private edu-
cation, see supra note 2, failure to provide some form of aid to private education may
generate as much political activism along religious lines as do actual assistance
programs.
41. See supra note 23.
42. Addressing the question of excessive church-state entanglement, the Eighth
Circuit in Bogen v. Doty concluded: "Thus where there is some peripheral effect or
entanglement of government with religion, it does appear to be a matter of degree.
We must consider both the actual impact of the practice in modem society as well as
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/5
TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR SCHOOL EXPENSES
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist,43 the Supreme Court appeared to narrow the primary effect
element of the establishment clause test.44 Nyquist involved a statute
providing direct money grants for maintenance and repair to private
schools45 and tuition tax credits to parents of private school chil-
dren.' In determining that the grants and tax credits impermissibly
advanced religion, the Court suggested that some forms of public aid
are impermissible if they provide any assistance to religious
schools. 47 The Nyquist court concluded that tax benefits for parents
paying sectarian school tuition inevitably aid and advance religious
institutions.4 8 The fact that only parents of private school children
benefited under the statute bolstered the Court's finding of an imper-
missible effect.
49
The Nyquist decision left several questions unanswered. Although
the Court narrowed the scope of the primary effect test, it explicitly
declined to address the question whether public assistance made
the historical basis for the activity." 598 F.2d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 1979). Because
courts consider essentially the same facts when assessing primary effect and entangle-
ment, some observers believe that primary effect and excessive entanglement consti-
tute a single test. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at § 14-12 (historical
background of the excessive entanglements issue).
43. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
44 Id at 804.
45. The grants, provided to ensure the health and welfare of students, could not
exceed 50% of comparable expenses in public schools. Id at 763.
46. The tuition tax benefit program consisted of two parts: 1) a tuition reimburse-
ment plan for parents having children in private schools and having an annual in-
come of less than $5,000; 2) a tax deduction of a stipulated sum per child, unrelated to
the actual tuition paid. 413 U.S. at 756-57.
47. The Court decided that a judgment whether the assistance program satisfied
the "metaphysical" primary effect test would be impossible and unnecessary. Id at
783-84 n.39. The Court recalled that it had struck down federal construction grants
for religious colleges and universities "because the grant[s] might 'in part have the
effect of advancing religion."' 413 U.S. at 783-84 n.39 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971)) (emphasis in Nyquist).
48. 413 U.S. at 793.
49. Id at 782-83 n.38.
Justice Rehnquist (concurring in part and dissenting in part) found the benefit to
parents in Nyquist no more offensive than the aid to parents in Allen (lending of
public textbooks), see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text, or in E verson (state
funded transportation of students), see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 413
U.S. at 810. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part, wrote:
"It is no more than simple equity to grant partial relief to parents who support the
public schools they do not use." Id at 803.
1984]
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available to both public and private school students satisfied constitu-
tional strictures." Further, the Court specifically reserved judgment
concerning the constitutionality of genuine tax deductions as opposed
to tax credits." Decisions subsequent to Nyquist failed to provide
specific guidelines to assess the constitutionality of private school
assistance legislation. 2
In contrast to the narrow restrictions imposed by Nyquist upon the
primary effect element of the establishment clause test,53 the Supreme
Court in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Re-
gan5 4 expanded the degree of government entanglement with reli-
gion acceptable under the test. In Regan, the Court addressed
whether use of public funds to reimburse private schools for con-
ducting state mandated tests and services violated the establishment
clause.5  Finding that the statute 56 satisfied establishment clause re-
50. 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38.
51. Id at 790 n.49. The Court observed that the tax benefit in Nyquist, though
technically a tax deduction, was "in effect a tax credit" and a tax "forgiveness." Id at
789.
In theory, a tax deduction is inherently more limited as a benefit. Unlike a tax
credit, a tax deduction cannot reimburse to the taxpayer all of his or her parochial
school expenses. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3076 n.5 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
52. "'Corrosive precedents' have left us without finn principles on which to de-
cide these cases." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977) (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947)). Instead, courts have drawn narrow, technical
legal distinctions. Compare Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (allowed direct, unrestricted cash grants to sectarian colleges and universities)
with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (disallowed cash supplements to sec-
tarian elementary and secondary schools for supplementing salaries). Compare Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (upheld a program providing remedial tutoring
and guidance counseling off campus) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
(overruled a similar program conducted on campus).
The Supreme Court Justices frequently disagree over the extent to which states may
extend assistance to sectarian schools. In Meek, a case involving a state program
providing textbooks, educational materials and human services for private school stu-
dents, Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall found none of the aid acceptable.
Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stewart found only the textbooks acceptable. Justices
Burger, Rehnquist, and White found all of the aid acceptable. For a breakdown of
the opinions in Wolman, involving an Ohio statute which authorized six forms of aid
to private schools, see Weber, supra note 26, at 548-49 nn.99-100.
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
55. The Court had previously held a similar statute unconstitutional in Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). The New York
Legislature enacted the statute upheld in Regan in an attempt to overcome the consti-
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straints, the Court upheld for the first time direct financial aid to pri-
vate elementary and secondary schools.57 Because the state prepared
the tests administered by the private schools, the Court reasoned that
no sectarian purposes could be furthered,58 even though private
school employees administered the tests.59 Despite a prescribed state
auditing procedure and the need for regular appropriation of funds,
the Court did not find an excessive entanglement of state with reli-
gious institutions.6"
tutional deficiencies of the earlier one overruled in Levitt. The earlier statute reim-
bursed sectarian schools for preparing and grading teacher-prepared tests. The
statute failed, however, to provide a means to audit school financial records, thus
failing to guarantee use of the reimbursements for secular purposes only.
56. The statute reimbursed sectarian schools for the costs of administering and
keeping records of state-prepared tests. In addition, the statute provided an auditing
procedure to ensure the use of state funds for secular purposes only. 444 U.S. at 651-
52
57 The Court has long distinguished direct money grants to sectarian colleges
and universities from grants to sectarian elementary and secondary schools. In the
Court's view, sectarian institutions of higher learning are less pervasively sectarian
than parochial elementary and secondary schools, and college students are less im-
pressionable than younger students. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md.,
426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upheld direct, unrestricted cash grants to sectarian colleges and
universities); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upheld issuance of revenue bonds
assisting construction projects at private colleges); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971) (upheld one-time grants for construction on private college campuses) (re-
manded on other grounds). See generally Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer:
From Separation to Detente in Church-State Relations, 55 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1977)
(analysis of the development of establishment clause rationale in cases of public aid to
private colleges and universities).
58. Two of the tests consisted of multiple choice questions. A third test contained
some essay questions on secular subjects. 444 U.S. at 655-56.
59 The nature of the aid proffered by the state to religious schools figures dra-
matically in cases of aid for private education. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977), the Court upheld a statute authorizing the expenditure of state funds to supply
standardized tests to private schools. Id at 238-39. Because sectarian school teachers
could not use the tests for religious purposes, thus eliminating the need for state su-
pervision, the statute satisfied the primary effect and excessive entanglement tests. In
marked contrast to Regan and Wolman, the Court in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975). invalidated portions of a Pennsylvania statute providing state subsidized gui-
dance counseling and remedial speech and hearing services. Although public teach-
ers and counselors provided the services, the Court feared "inadvertent fostering of
religion" in an "atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief...
421 U.S. at 370-71.
60. "[T]he services for which the private schools would be reimbursed are discrete
and clearly identifiable" and the reimbursement process is "straightforward." 444
U.S. at 660. "[W]e are not prepared to read into the plan as an inevitability the bad
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In Mueller v. Allen,61 the Supreme Court held that tax deductions
made available to public and private school parents for transporta-
tion, textbook and tuition expenses do not violate the establishment
clause. As in earlier decisions, the Court readily found a sufficient
secular purpose for the assistance program.62 The Court next ana-
lyzed the primary effect of the program, noting that the availability of
the tax deduction to all parents avoided the appearance of govern-
mental approval of religious organizations.63 More significantly, the
Court found that the program directly assisted parents. Parochial
schools benefited only indirectly as a result of private choices made
by parentsf' The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that statis-
tical evidence demonstrated that parochial school parents comprised
the principal class of beneficiaries under the statute. The Mueller
court concluded that reliance on local statistics to assess the constitu-
faith upon which any future excessive entanglement would be predicated." Id at
660-61.
For an extensive discussion of the church-state entanglement theory and an opinion
that Regan weakened the entanglement theory beyond usefulness, see Note, The For-
bidden Fruit of Church-State Contacts: The Role of Entanglement Theory in its Rioen-
ing, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. RaV. 725 (1982).
61. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (5-4 decision). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice Powell and Justice
O'Connor joined. Justice Marshall was joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens in dissent.
62. The Court discerned from the face of the statute an intent by the state legisla-
ture to ensure a well-educated citizenry and to help sectarian schools meet their share
of the educational burden. Id at 3066-67.
63. Id at 3068-69. The majority distinguished Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Id InNyquist, the Court invalidated a
New York statute that made tax credits for school expenses available only to parents
of private school children. Although Nyquist expressly reserved the question whether
benefits made available to students without regard to the public-private nature of the
schools could withstand constitutional attack, see supra note 50 and accompanying
text, the distinction appears to be superficial. In Mueller, only 4% of the parents who
could actually deduct tuition expenses sent their children to nonsecular schools, as
opposed to 15% in Nyquist.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3069. The Court has long considered state programs benefiting
sectarian education to be a factor in establishment clause analysis. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court struck down a Pennsylvania program of
teacher salary supplements paid directly to the schools. The Court distinguished Ev-
erson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), as cases where "state aid was provided to the student and his parents-not to
the church-related school." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621. But see Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding reimbursements
for test and services paid directly to private schools).
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tionality of a facially neutral law would require arbitrary line-draw-
ing65 and would fail to recognize the public benefit attributable to
parochial schools' function in the education system.66 Finally, the
Court found that government entanglement with religion did not ex-
ceed the degree of entanglement upheld in prior decisions.67
The Mueller dissent found that the neutrality principle underlying
the establishment clause prohibited the entire statute.68 According to
the dissent, the Constitution proscribes any direct or indirect govern-
ment assistance to parochial schools, 69 unless the assistance is re-
stricted to the schools' purely secular functions.7" Because tax
deductions for parochial school expenses provide an incentive for
parents to send their children to parochial schools, 7 the entire sectar-
ian enterprise benefits from the financial assistance.7" The dissent
looked beyond the breadth of beneficiaries on the face of the statute
and relied upon statistical data in determining that parents of paro-
chial school children received the most benefit.7 3 The dissent did not
suggest any excessive entanglement problem, possibly because it fore-
65. Commenting on the use of local statistics to assess the constitutionality of the
tax deduction, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[s]uch an approach would scarcely pro-
vide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled
standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated." 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
66. Id See generally Note, Public Funding of Private Education: A Public Policy
Analysis, 10 J. LEGIS. 146, 153-59 (1983) (a discussion of policy arguments for and
against increased government funding of private elementary and secondary schools).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 307 1. The Court foresaw no problem with state officials deciding
which textbooks and materials were nonsecular in nature. Id Cf. Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977) (upholding textbook loans to nonpublic school students); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (upholding textbook loans to non-public school stu-
dents), Board of Educ. v. Alien, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding textbook loans to
nonpublic school students).
68 103 S, Ct. at 3071.
69 Id
70. Id at 3072-73.
71. Id at 3073 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973)). The degree to which the tax benefit actually stimu-
lates parents to send their children to parochial schools is questionable. In Rhode
Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (lst Cir. 1980) where
the First Circuit considered a Rhode Island statute nearly identical to the Minnesota
statute in Mueller, the court hypothesized a family of four having a federal taxable
income of $8,000 and paying a total tuition of S 1,400 for two children attending paro-
chial high schools. In 1979, the family's net tax savings under the statute would have
amounted to only $44.08. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 859 n.6.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 3072-73, quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 3072-74.
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saw no attempt by the state to restrict the financial support to secular
uses.
74
The closely divided Mueller decision exemplifies the difficulty the
Court has experienced applying the establishment clause to particular
state assistance programs. The majority deemed the tax benefits ac-
ceptable because they were available to all parents and assisted
schools only indirectly. The dissent, in contrast, focused upon
whether the sectarian as well as the secular functions of the schools
benefited. Previous decisions support both viewpoints.75
Although both Mueller and Nyquist involved statutes granting tax
benefits for tuition expenses, the Court distinguished Nyquist on the
grounds that parents of only private school children qualified for the
benefits.76 Significantly, Nyquist had expressly distinguished both
Everson andAllen in which the statutes facially benefited both public
and private school students.7 7 Thus, Mueller is consistent with Ever-
son and Allen in holding that a broad class of beneficiaries tends to
indicate state neutrality toward religion.78
The tax deduction in Mueller bore a direct relation to the amount
actually spent by parents for qualifying expenses. The Court specifi-
cally refrained from determining the constitutionality of a tuition
credit statute in Nyquist, where the tax benefit bore no relation to the
amount actually paid.79 The Minnesota statute provided relief to a
broad spectrum of citizens and in direct proportion to parents' ex-
penditures, thereby avoiding the implication that the state offered the
tax benefit as an incentive to send children to sectarian schools rather
than as a genuine attempt to ease the financial burden of educating
children.8" The Mueller dissent interpreted Nyquist as prohibiting
any benefits offered directly to parents who send their children to
sectarian schools.8 1 In rejecting this interpretation, Mueller remains
74. Id at 3078.
75. For example, both Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), upheld statutes making assistance generally avail-
able to all school children. In both cases, however, the assistance was strictly secular
in nature. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 3068-69.
77. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
78. See supra note 37.
79. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
80. The statute does not "confer any imprimatur of State approval." 103 S. Ct. at
3068 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
81. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated: "Nyquist made clear, however, that
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consistent with the Everson and Allen view that sectarian benefit inci-
dental to a neutral public assistance statute does not render the stat-
ute unconstitutional.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Mueller voiced serious con-
cern regarding excessive entanglement with religion. Although little
risk of political entanglement exists,"2 the administrative procedures
necessary to police the secular textbook and materials provision pose
potential entanglement problems. The court in Regan clearly held
that, in some circumstances, the state may utilize auditing procedures
to guarantee that sectarian schools use state funds for secular pur-
poses only.83 In Regan, the state-prepared student tests remained im-
mutably secular in nature;8 4 textbooks, however, lend themselves
more readily to sectarian purposes. Similarly, in Allen, public school
officials certified the secular nature of the textbooks lent to parochial
school students.85 In Mueller, however, religious schools or parents
themselves determined which textbooks the students bought. Both
Regan and Mueller demonstrate the Court's decreasing emphasis
upon the excessive entanglement element of establishment clause
analysis.
Mueller brought into sharp focus the predominant issue concerning
public assistance for private education: whether legislation intended
to support the secular functions of sectarian schools contravenes gov-
ernment neutrality toward religion. In upholding a state statute
which permits parents of both public and private school children to
deduct tuition and other educational expenses, the Supreme Court in
Mueller found that the benefit to society from such legislation ex-
ceeds the dangers which may result. Legislators will continue to for-
mulate programs to support both public and private education.86
Mueller provides a sensible framework for achieving that objective.
Gregory K. Allsberry
absolutely no subsidization is permissible unless it is restricted to the purely secular
functions of those schools." 103 S. Ct. at 3076 n.5 (emphasis added).
82. Because the benefit to parents comes in the form of a tax deduction, the bene-
fit does not require annual appropriation of funds.
83. See supra notes 55, 56 & 60 and accompanying text.
84, See supra note 58.
85. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
86. See supra note 2.
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